

**SINO-TIBETAN COEXISTENCE**  
**Creating Space for Tibetan Self-Direction**

*A Conference Report*

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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE



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**The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.**

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# Executive Summary

The improvement of relations between Tibetans and Chinese depends on increasing the scope of Tibetan political, cultural, and religious self-direction within the context of a continuing legal connection between China and Tibet. This was the central conclusion of a recent conference on Tibet hosted by the United States Institute of Peace as part of its continuing series on Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance. The conference examined the state of relations between Tibetans and the Chinese government, attempting to identify the fundamental sources of conflict and to determine realistic steps toward amelioration. Special attention was devoted to intolerance and discrimination in cultural and religious matters as contributing factors to tensions between Tibetans and Han Chinese.

## *Legal and Historical Issues*

In 1949-51, the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) sent military forces into Tibet and imposed a new political order that is still in place in Tibet today. While disagreements over the legal and historical issues surrounding this political situation are central to Sino-Tibetan relations, conflicting cultural and religious beliefs are an important underlying source of tension between the Chinese government and the Tibetans.

## *The Anatomy of Intolerance*

The PRC is bound by agreements and by its own laws to respect the autonomy of the people and culture of Tibet, but it has not honored such commitments. Marxist ideology and a strong sense of Han Chinese cultural superiority have provided the PRC with a justification to control and reconstruct Tibetan society. Tibetans perceive PRC policies as repressive and discriminatory, calculated to correct what many Han Chinese regard as the backward and superstitious allegiance of Tibetans to Buddhism.

Human rights abuses and significant maltreatment of Tibetans by PRC authorities have been pervasive since 1950. Repression and discrimination, lack of political and economic control by the Tibetan majority, and the continuing influx of ethnic Han immigrants have intensified Tibetan

antipathy toward the Chinese and their policies. These persisting trends have turned most Tibetans against the Chinese despite material improvements the Chinese have introduced into the region.

### ***Religion and Tibetan Identity***

Tibetan Buddhism is a blend of culture, religious practice, and tradition that defines Tibetans as a unique people. Consequently, Han Chinese control over the region—and particularly control over the religious institutions of the society—is seen by Tibetans as an assault on their very identity as a distinctive Buddhist society. Further, Tibetans do not accept the distinction the PRC draws between "normal religious activities," which it permits, and political expression in the name of religion, which it does not.

So long as Tibetans are denied a greater measure of self-direction, including the right to define for themselves acceptable forms of religious expression, practice, and education, political agitation by monks and nuns for independence is likely to persist.

### ***Space for Tibetan Self-Direction***

Increasing Tibetan control over political, economic, and religious life within Tibet appears to be the only viable means of reducing tension in the region between Chinese and Tibetans.

Although most Tibetans are said to oppose anything short of secession, the Dalai Lama, as spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, has demonstrated a willingness to consider options short of complete independence. Previous statements by the Dalai Lama indicate that he might be amenable to negotiating an arrangement to give greater autonomy to the Tibetan people within a federal structure. Such an arrangement might represent a common basis for agreement.

### ***Prospects for Settlement***

While current PRC policy toward Tibet inspires little optimism that a process of reconciliation can be initiated, there is some room for hope. At present, authorities in Beijing hold differing views on how to deal with persisting tensions in Tibet. Some leaders, supported by a growing number of



intellectuals, appear to favor greater tolerance for cultural diversity in China. Tibetan Buddhism might even come to be regarded as a positive cultural resource rather than a liability. Such a spirit would likely accompany a new receptivity to more genuine autonomy for distinct peoples such as the Tibetans.

On the other hand, if nothing is done to resolve the enduring tensions between Tibetans and Chinese, Tibetan antipathy seems certain to increase, and with it the likelihood of severe ethnic violence. The Dalai Lama's continuing emphasis on nonviolence, so far successful in restraining Tibetan resistance, may lose credibility in the absence of a constructive response from the Chinese.

### ***Toward Promoting Reconciliation***

There was general consensus among the conference participants that a satisfactory agreement would depend on the following:

- Establishing a dialogue between PRC authorities and the Tibetans to create an atmosphere in which to negotiate greater Tibetan autonomy within the context of a larger confederation.
- Establishing provisions for regulating the influx of Chinese immigrants into Tibet.
- Promoting respect for human rights, including freedom of religion and education, and determining mechanisms for ensuring compliance.
- Developing measures for regulating environmental abuses in Tibet.
- Ensuring legitimate Chinese security interests in the region.

### ***Policy Implications***

Conference participants called attention to the following policy concerns:

- Growing concern throughout the world for the integrity and worth of distinctive cultures and peoples raises new international expectations. The way countries like China treat such groups will therefore be subject to increasing international scrutiny.
- Negotiation of the key issues between the Chinese government and Tibetans in an atmosphere of open communication is essential.
- Opportunities for third-party mediation may exist and should be explored.

The views expressed in this document are drawn from the conference discussion; however, conclusions on specific points may not be shared by all the participants. It should be noted that representatives of the People's Republic of China were invited to attend the conference but declined.

# Creating Space for Tibetan Self-Direction

As part of its continuing series on Religion, Nationalism, and Intolerance, the United States Institute of Peace held a conference on September 28 and 29, 1993, titled *Tibet: Religion, Conflict and Cooperation*. The conference examined the state of relations between Tibetans and the Chinese government, attempting to identify the fundamental sources of conflict and to determine realistic steps toward amelioration. Special attention was devoted to intolerance and discrimination in cultural and religious matters as contributing factors to tensions between Tibetans and Han Chinese. **The central conclusion was that improvement of relations depends on Chinese authorities' supporting an increase in the scope of Tibetan political, cultural, and religious self-direction within the context of a continuing legal connection between China and Tibet.**<sup>1</sup>

## Sources of Conflict

### *Legal and Historical Issues*

In 1949–51, the newly established Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) sent military forces into Tibet and imposed a new political order that is still in place in Tibet today. The PRC described its action as "the peaceful liberation of Tibet," which, it said, provided defense against outside "imperialists" and brought freedom and improved living conditions to the "broad masses of serfs in Tibet [who] eagerly wanted to break the shackles of serfdom."<sup>2</sup> The PRC claims it intervened only after provocation,<sup>3</sup> and that "the peaceful liberation of Tibet enjoyed the approval and support of the people from every ethnic group in Tibet."<sup>4</sup>

In further justification of its action, the PRC claimed legal sovereignty of long standing over Tibet, a view that has been supported by the U.S. State Department.<sup>5</sup> By some accounts, Chinese sovereignty was supposed to have begun as early as the ninth century. The official PRC view accepts the thirteenth century, under the Yuan Dynasty, as the point when Tibet became

incorporated into China, thereby establishing a relationship that is supposed to have prevailed through the Ming (1368–1644) and the Qing (1644–1911) dynasties. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet is said to have continued during the period between the 1911 Revolution—which established the Republic of China—and the founding of the PRC in 1949, despite efforts by "imperialist forces . . . to carve up China, Tibet included."<sup>6</sup> According to the PRC, the relationship has never been based on conquest or forcible annexation, but on mutual agreement and international recognition. Most important, this perspective rejects any claim of Tibetan independence. "For more than 700 years the central government of China has continuously exercised sovereignty over Tibet, and Tibet has never been an independent state."<sup>7</sup>

Tibetans, including the Tibetan spiritual leader and primary political authority-in-exile, the Dalai Lama, reject these claims. In this view, Tibet was an independent country prior to 1949/50, and the military action by the PRC was an illegal violation of Tibet's legitimate sovereignty. "Since Tibetan emperors unified Tibet, over a thousand years ago, our country was able to maintain its independence until the middle of this century. . . . [T]he country's occasional subjection to foreign influence never entailed a loss of independence. And there can be no doubt that when Peking's communist armies entered Tibet, Tibet was in all respects an independent state."<sup>8</sup> On the strength of this reading, many Tibetans fervently assert a right of self-determination and independence from China. They also maintain that Tibet continues to suffer illegal occupation by PRC forces. The Dalai Lama emphasized this point in an address to members of the U.S. Congress in 1987. "As China's military occupation of Tibet continues, the world should remember that though Tibetans have lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation."<sup>9</sup>

The question of historical sovereignty is complicated by conflicting interpretations of the so-called "priest-patron" relationship that existed between earlier Tibetan hierarchs and the Mongol and Manchu emperors. From the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and to a lesser extent thereafter until 1911, Tibetans gained military and political protection from their "patrons" in return for the spiritual guidance and legitimacy that the

Tibetan "priest" conferred upon the emperor. For example, in the thirteenth century, the Mongol emperor Kubilai Khagan (1259–1294) granted the Tibetan Lama Tishri Pagpa the title of Imperial Preceptor, thus designating Buddhism as the state religion and Pagpa as spiritual master over the Mongol empire. Also conferred upon Pagpa was temporal rule over Tibet, which—unlike other periods—was in the emperor's power to give. In return, "the lama (Pagpa) provided the legitimation required by the 'barbarian' Mongol conqueror in order to rule over China and their world Empire."<sup>10</sup>

The Chinese claim that the political sovereignty established in this period over Tibet continued for centuries, extending through succeeding dynasties. This claim of political control is evidenced by the granting of titles to Tibetan religious leaders, Chinese control over Tibetan religious succession,<sup>11</sup> and the intermittent continuation of the priest-patron relationship. However, Michael van Walt van Praag, in his book *The Status of Tibet*, has noted that the priest-patron relationship was really between the Tibetans and the Mongols, the latter having ruled China between 1279 and 1368 under the Yuan dynasty. Consequently, when the Yuan dynasty ended in 1368 with Chinese independence from Mongol rule, the Ming dynasty (Han Chinese) did not retain control over Tibet—let alone continue the unique priest-patron relationship or otherwise control the Tibetan religious hierarchy—despite PRC assertions otherwise.

However convincing these arguments may be, there are two important reasons why the legal and historical issues are likely to remain as a source of conflict. First, the PRC has made it clear that whatever the degree of dissent and controversy over its historical claims to sovereignty, Tibetan independence is simply non-negotiable. Second, there is at present no international legal consensus regarding the force of claims to a right of independence based on history, such as the Tibetans assert. Tibet has not been universally recognized as an independent nation-state, though it has exhibited characteristics of autonomy<sup>12</sup> and maintained bilateral relations with Mongolia, Nepal, India, and Bhutan. International legal notions of sovereignty and independence, however, have been shaped in the context of nineteenth-century European hegemony, which based statehood on formal

recognition by European states.<sup>13</sup> Since Tibet did not maintain such bilateral ties, its independence was not recognized. Tibetans argue that this view of statehood does not take into account the relations between Tibet and its neighbors nor the political autonomy it may have enjoyed from time to time. They also argue that by this standard, many Asian nations of that time could not properly be considered states.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Cultural and Religious Intolerance***

While disagreements over legal and historical issues are unquestionably central to Sino-Tibetan relations, conflicting cultural and religious beliefs are an important underlying source of tension. Convinced of its mission as the agent of progress and liberation, the PRC has considered itself justified in controlling and reconstructing Tibetan society. There is a deep-seated ideological hostility on the part of the Communist party toward religion, and a cultural and ethnic bias against the "backward" Tibetans. These attitudes are coupled with Chinese policies of political and economic discrimination and religious repression. According to the U.S. State Department, "ethnic minorities are effectively shut out of all but a few positions of real political and decision-making power."<sup>15</sup> In response to these attitudes and policies, Tibetans harbor a strong (and growing) anti-Chinese sentiment that fosters a sense of mutual intolerance and serious potential for ethnic conflict.

### ***Religion and Tibetan Identity***

Tibetan Buddhism is a unique blend of culture, religious practice, and tradition. As such, it defines the Tibetan people. In the words of one of the participants, "all levels of Tibetan identity are . . . inextricably interwoven with the Tibetans' religious identification of themselves as Buddhists."<sup>16</sup> In other words, racial, ethnic, and group identity are all infused with a religious orientation.

The link between religious and ethnic identity is of course common in other regions of the world, as is the link between racial and linguistic identity. What is unusual about Tibet is the depth of connection between religion and government. Buddhism permeated Tibetan culture and society to such an

extent that "the history of Tibet . . . is almost the same as the history of the importation of Buddhism into Tibet. . . ."17 The traditional role of the Dalai Lama since the 17th century as both spiritual and political leader of the Tibetan people underscores this point, as does the ideal of the monk as custodian of both religious and civic activities such as education.

Tibetans, consequently, regard Chinese control over the region as an assault on their very identity as a distinctive Buddhist society. In particular, attempts by the government to undermine the connection between religion and political and social life are considered to be a blatant and indefensible form of cultural suppression. Tibetans do not readily accept the distinction the PRC draws between "normal religious activities," which it permits, and political expression in the name of religion, which it does not.

U.S. State Department and Senate reports<sup>18</sup> document recent violations of the human rights of Tibetans, particularly in regard to the activities of monks and nuns associated with the independence movement. These violations include discrimination, detention, torture, and religious and cultural persecution, as well as restrictions on freedoms of expression. At times since 1950, the record has amounted to a policy of out-and-out "culturecide," with deliberate attempts, inspired by Maoist ideology, to eradicate an entire way of life. As a result, large numbers of Tibetans have lost their lives, and the destruction of monasteries and other religious shrines throughout the country has taken place on a monumental scale. <sup>19</sup>

So long as Tibetans are denied a greater measure of self-direction, particularly the right to define for themselves acceptable forms of religious expression, practice, and education, political agitation by monks and nuns in favor of independence is likely to persist.

### *Freedom of Religion*

Although the PRC has committed itself to respecting the autonomy of the Tibetan people<sup>20</sup> and to allowing religious freedom,<sup>21</sup> it has also engaged—to varying degrees since 1950—in repressive and discriminatory policies toward Tibetans and Tibetan religious and cultural practices. PRC

behavior in the early stages of occupation has been depicted as grossly intolerant, particularly prior to and during the Cultural Revolution. Between 1979 and 1984 Chinese policies toward Tibetan religious expression eased somewhat, coinciding with the high-level contacts between the exile community and Chinese officials at that time. Since the late 1980s, though, military crackdowns on religious or cultural activities linked to political agitation have continued.

Chinese policy toward Tibetan Buddhism falls generally into four phases. The first was the early period in the 1950s and early 1960s following the PRC's military occupation of Tibet. During this time, the Chinese established an administrative apparatus to control religious expression and manage the affairs of the monasteries. The PRC authorities also attempted to reshape Tibetan thought and behavior by suppressing Buddhism and by quelling expressions of Tibetan discontent. These efforts ranged from daily "political education meetings" and the imprisonment of monks and others in labor camps, to submitting malcontents to a practice known as *thamzing* (struggle sessions),<sup>22</sup> which entailed public trials, severe beatings, and coerced confessions of "crimes," often ending in public execution.

The attempt to reshape Tibetan culture and manage individual expression intensified Tibetan hostility toward the Chinese and strengthened traditional Tibetan loyalties. This reaction, in turn, provoked further attempts by the Chinese to impose ideological correctness and political control. "By the late 1950s, the Chinese authorities viewed religion as the principal obstacle to their control of Tibet. The steadily increasing resistance to the Chinese agenda was largely due to the Tibetans' desire to protect their religious and cultural traditions."<sup>23</sup> The tensions between the Tibetans and Chinese eventually led to the uprising in 1959 and the departure into exile of the Dalai Lama.

The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) reviewed this situation in 1959. Among other things, its report<sup>24</sup> concluded that



- 1) PRC policy has attempted to systematically eradicate Buddhism from Tibet.<sup>25</sup>
- 2) Religious figures have been killed because of their religious beliefs.
- 3) PRC actions have forcibly transferred large numbers of Tibetan children to a Chinese materialist environment in order to prevent them from having a religious upbringing.
- 4) Because of the role of religion in Tibet, the PRC policies to eradicate religion lead "...ultimately to the question whether the crime of Genocide has been committed."<sup>26</sup>

The Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, constituted the second phase of relations between the PRC and Tibet, and it involved a relentless and systematic attempt to destroy Tibetan Buddhism in all its forms. During this period and the previous period, the vast majority of Tibet's estimated six thousand<sup>27</sup> monasteries were looted and razed. Religious activity was strictly banned, as was the wearing of traditional dress. The Chinese government waged war on "the four olds"—old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits—in favor of "the four news"—Mao's new ideology, proletarian culture, and communist habits and customs. While the effects of this period were felt throughout China, the minority areas, including Tibet, were particularly vulnerable to attack.

The third phase began to emerge in the mid-1970s, though it did not take hold until 1980, when Hu Yaobang, the Communist party general secretary, made an historic visit to Tibet. Distressed at what he found, Hu called for a relaxation of the policy of suppression and advocated somewhat greater cultural and religious freedom for Tibetans. This approach<sup>28</sup>—though never successfully implemented—led to the current phase, which allows a measured degree of personal religious and cultural expression, although any activities taken to be politically motivated are harshly punished. Religious practice at designated places of worship is allowed, but religious gatherings or organizational activities beyond state control are not. As Lodi Gyari has written, this distinction creates new problems. "Today, there is a religious surge in Tibet partially because expressing faith in the dharma is a way to express nationalism without being branded a 'separatist.' This phenomena is

straining Beijing's ability to implement lenient policies toward religion, given their obsession for quelling centers of power outside of the Communist Party in Tibet."<sup>29</sup>

Under current policy, the continuing control of the monasteries, which were the center of traditional Tibetan education, remains a source of great concern to Tibetans. Prior to 1949/50, most education took place in monasteries, for many school children and for all monks and nuns. Monastic education was a vast enterprise and an essential part of Tibetan religious self-understanding. The monastic system was an extensive and elaborate web of institutions, many of which could house from three to ten thousand persons. The education of monks extended from ages five to forty-five and entailed a demanding curriculum involving Buddhist ritual, the memorization of sacred texts, oral debate, and other scholastic studies. The advent of Communist rule led to the demise of the monasteries. Educational levels of monks dropped, and a system of Chinese education was substituted for school children and for the traditional monastic pattern.

Of late, the Chinese government has allowed some of the monasteries to reopen, probably about two hundred of them. Nevertheless, students and staff are strictly limited and closely controlled. Estimates place the number of resident monks at between 5 and 10 percent of pre-1949/50 levels. Admission to study in the monasteries requires approval from local authorities associated with the Communist party and is based on political and ideological qualifications.<sup>30</sup> Since 1990, physical access to many monasteries has been carefully restricted. Pilgrims must possess entry passes, and monks may not leave without a permit from Democratic Management Committees (DMCs).<sup>31</sup>

The Chinese government established DMCs to manage and monitor the affairs of each monastery. In most instances, DMCs have replaced the traditional system of governance by the monastic hierarchy. They control monastery finances and are accountable only to local authorities. While the practices of the DMCs vary from place to place—ranging from repression in larger monasteries to considerable permissiveness in smaller ones—the arrangement remains an effective means for exercising political control over

monks and nuns and their monasteries. There can be little doubt that even under the relatively more lenient policies of the present, the traditional function of the monastery as a vital repository of Tibetan religion, language, and culture continues to be severely compromised. As one of the Tibetan participants said, "Most Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet believe that Buddhism can only fully regain its health under a Tibetan administration. Until then, monasteries may be rebuilt, lay believers may be able to prostrate unimpeded, but the full range and depth of activities necessary for Tibetan Buddhism to survive and thrive, is still a long way off."<sup>32</sup>

### **Space for Tibetan Self-Direction**

Under its present policy, the Chinese government claims that, however things stood in the past, today's tensions in Tibet have nothing to do with religious and cultural intolerance. The only point of contention, says the government, is a dispute over political sovereignty. It is thus a political and not a religious problem. To give monks, nuns, and monasteries more control over what they say and how they conduct themselves would likely open the door to increasing agitation for Tibetan political independence. Since the Chinese are unconditionally opposed to that objective, they regard such agitation as a threat to the fundamental integrity of the People's Republic of China. The PRC authorities are bound, in this view, to consider agitation of that kind, by monks or anyone else, as nothing more than sedition.

This perspective, however, misjudges the complexity of the tensions between Tibetans and the Chinese government, as well as the means for resolving those tensions, in at least three ways.

First, present-day conditions in Tibet, in regard to religious, cultural, political, and economic matters, are still deeply influenced by the patterns of anti-Tibetan intolerance and discrimination that are the legacy of some forty years of Chinese rule. By all accounts, Chinese—not Tibetans—continue to occupy the positions of status, power, and authority throughout the society.

Chinese, not Tibetans, determine who gets what and why, at the national as well as at the local level.<sup>33</sup> There are also persistent reports of racist attitudes and other forms of cultural, religious, and linguistic prejudice that continue to poison relations between Tibetans and Chinese.

This pattern of intolerance, which is deeply ingrained, is nonetheless separable from the question of the legal relationship between China and Tibet. Even if Tibet is to be regarded as a part of China, that is no warrant for the blatant forms of bigotry and discrimination that continue to exist. By implication, therefore, the patterns of intolerance and discrimination may begin to be addressed and rectified without necessarily altering the legal status of Tibet or advocating its complete political independence.

Second, while the PRC has consistently refused to reconsider its legal claims of sovereignty over Tibet, it has, in fact, solemnly committed itself to the political and cultural autonomy of Tibet, and to a set of particulars specifying what autonomy means. In the *Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet* (the *Seventeen-Point Agreement*), signed in 1951,<sup>34</sup> the PRC pledged itself to a "policy of freedom of religious belief," to respect for the "established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama," and to the "right [of the Tibetan people] of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government."<sup>35</sup> Of course, both parties consider the agreement to have been rendered void, and Tibetans today would find it inadequate. Still, some of the principles are suggestive as a basis for settlement, especially those that promise genuine respect for political, religious, and cultural self-direction.

Third, Tibetan leaders, and particularly the Dalai Lama himself, may be open to some form of federated status that provides for expanded Tibetan autonomy within a Chinese confederation. Although most Tibetans are said to oppose anything short of secession, the Dalai Lama appears to be willing to consider options short of complete independence. He feels that an arrangement ensuring greater authentic Tibetan autonomy will help to bring peace and the reduction of resentment toward Chinese by Tibetans. Specifically, he has laid out a compromise negotiating strategy in his Five-

Point Peace Plan proposed in 1987, as well as in the Strasbourg proposal of 1988.

The Five-Point Plan calls for transforming Tibet (ultimately) into a zone of *Ahimsa*, a Hindi term meaning a state of peace and nonviolence; abandoning the population transfer of Chinese into Tibet; respecting the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights; protecting Tibet's environment; and commencing earnest negotiations. According to the Strasbourg proposal, Tibet "could become a self-governing democratic entity founded on law by agreement of the people . . . in association with the Peoples' Republic of China." Such thinking reflects certain general terms of agreement that already exist on paper between the PRC and Tibet. It begins to address both the desire of the Tibetans to have a greater say in their own affairs and the desire of the PRC to preserve national unity against the threat of ethnic independence movements.

Seeking such middle ground on these issues moves away from the absolute extremes of complete independence, on the one hand, and continued military, political, and cultural domination, on the other. So long as the problem is conceived in purely political terms, terms that reduce everything to a dispute over Tibetan political independence, the abiding relevance of cultural and religious discrimination is obscured. Also obscured, therefore, is the need for the Chinese government to begin to reverse its destructive policies by easing restrictions on Tibetan self-expression, irrespective of its legal claims to sovereignty over Tibet. To provide increased space for the exercise of Tibetan self-direction is to make a start toward overcoming the legacy of intolerance.

The importance of pursuing such an approach has been well expressed by the Dalai Lama. "The deprivation of freedom to express one's views, either by force or by other means, is absolutely anachronistic and a brutal form of oppression. . . . The people of the world will not only oppose it, but will condemn it. Hence, the six million Tibetan people must have the right to preserve, and enhance their cultural identity and religious freedom, the right

to determine their own destiny and manage their own affairs, and find fulfillment of their free self-expression. . . . This is reasonable and just."<sup>36</sup>

## **Prospects for Settlement**

Current PRC policy toward Tibet inspires little optimism that a process of reconciliation can be initiated, but there is perhaps some room for hope. As one commentator at the conference mentioned, there may be "new space for negotiation." The government needs to maintain at least the appearance of a unified political entity, of course, but it is "willing to negotiate almost anything, given the kind of [economic emphasis] which dominates not only the central government, but all of the local governments as well."<sup>37</sup> In other words, the current Chinese government is probably more pragmatic, and thus less interested in preserving ideological orthodoxy, than was true previously. Some Chinese participants added that Tibet has long been an economic liability to China, and there may therefore be an economic incentive for working out a new arrangement. Another participant stressed the development of a newly positive attitude among some Marxists towards Buddhism.<sup>38</sup>

At present, authorities in Beijing appear to hold differing views on how to deal with Tibet. Some of them undoubtedly oppose considering a new approach, which would explain the government's refusal to participate in the Institute conference. Though old commitments to abolishing "feudalism" in all its forms and renovating society on a Marxist and Maoist model have lost much influence among Chinese leaders, the ideals of Chinese nationalism and of a powerful central government with cultural as well as political hegemony over regions like Tibet still resonate within the leadership.

At the same time, other leaders, according to one participant, appear to be influenced by a new mood of tolerance for cultural diversity. This mood is supported by a growing number of intellectuals who have begun to appreciate the rich cultural and religious resources of Tibet and India, and of

other neighboring non-Confucian traditions. Such a change in thinking about cultural, spiritual, and intellectual issues could open the door to new, more pluralistic political policies. It would be a "sign of maturity of the Chinese mentality and the Chinese ability to deal with Tibet, not just [as] a political issue, but as an ethical, religious issue. And, this, I think, is happening, especially in the last ten years."<sup>39</sup>

Clearly, an essential factor in alleviating Sino-Tibetan tensions must be a shift in attitude by Chinese authorities toward Tibet and Tibetan culture. Tibetan traditions would then be seen as a positive cultural resource rather than as a liability, and Tibetans would be respected and trusted enough to begin to manage their own affairs. On the other hand, if no such shift takes place and no consideration is given to greater Tibetan autonomy, Tibetan antipathy seems certain to increase, and with it the likelihood of severe ethnic violence. The Dalai Lama's continuing emphasis on nonviolence, so far successful in restraining Tibetan resistance, may lose credibility in the absence of a constructive response from the Chinese.

## **Steps Toward Promoting Reconciliation**

There was general consensus among the conference participants that a process of reconciliation will depend on the following considerations:

• Establishing a dialogue between PRC authorities and the Tibetans so as to create an atmosphere in which to negotiate greater Tibetan autonomy within the context of a Chinese confederation.

There are two issues here: (1) establishing a dialogue and (2) developing a framework for greater autonomy. Open dialogue has been hard to come by; however, as in many other disputes, dialogue is an essential first step toward resolving conflict. Such dialogue would be most credible if carried out between PRC authorities and the Dalai Lama. Negotiations between these parties should be directed primarily at substantive aspects of autonomy. "The granting of a high degree of formal as well as actual

autonomy to Tibet, if accompanied by effective guarantees, would undoubtedly represent a substantial improvement over the present state of affairs."<sup>40</sup>

Real, as opposed to nominal, autonomy would entail effective control by Tibetans over local issues. Autonomy is generally understood to mean religious, cultural, political, and economic self-determination. Specifically, in Tibet, autonomy would include Tibetan supervision of monasteries and nunneries; respect for human rights norms—particularly freedom of speech, assembly, and religious and cultural expression; and opportunity for Tibetans to have greater control over local government. Such Tibetan control could be manifest in many different ways. The recent agreement between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization could be one model for local control. The viability of this approach is made possible by Article 31 of the PRC constitution, which allows for the establishment of special administrative regions, and the nominal status already granted Tibet as an "autonomous region."

The most important dimension of establishing a dialogue addressed solely to these issues of self-direction is that it need not be stifled by the ongoing debate over other legal and historical issues. "The question of the Tibetan people's right to self-determination is one that can be resolved apart from and irrespective of the past and present (legal) status of Tibet."<sup>41</sup>

• Establishing provisions for regulating the influx of Chinese immigrants into Tibet.

Chinese immigration into Tibet—as a result of government design or of economic forces—threatens the future of Tibet.<sup>42</sup> Statistics on the migration vary. Official Chinese sources put the percentage of Han Chinese currently residing in Tibet at 3 to 5 percent of the total population, while Tibetan exiles, and in particular the so-called "Tibetan government-in-exile," hold that Tibetans are already a minority in Tibet. Both of these estimates are at variance with other sources, which estimate the percentage of Chinese in Tibet to be between 7 and 14 percent,<sup>43</sup> excluding military personnel (13 to 24



percent if military personnel were included). These statistics apply only to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), though "in the Tibetan regions of other provinces . . . by all accounts the percentage of Han is very much higher."<sup>44</sup>

While it is difficult to find reliable documentation for any of the aforementioned statistics, recent travelers to Tibet have been alarmed by what they perceive as the large number of Chinese living in Lhasa. It is generally agreed that Chinese in Lhasa tend to enjoy superior political and economic standing. Consequently, the continuing influx of Han Chinese further diminishes opportunity and access to resources for Tibetans. It is the specter of Tibetans as a minority in the region that most concerns Tibetans and their supporters. The Dalai Lama has been quoted as saying "the population transfer of Chinese settlers into Tibet is of great concern to me, as it threatens the very survival of the Tibetan people and our culture."<sup>45</sup>

Part of the dispute over statistics can be clarified by defining the boundaries of Tibet. Han migration is growing most quickly in the Chinese provinces of Qinghai and parts of Sezhuan, Gansu, and Yunnan. Tibetans refer to these provinces as part of historic Tibet—known to Tibetans as the former provinces of Kham and Amdo—but they are not part of the TAR proper. According to one of the Chinese participants, the ratio of Han to other ethnic groups in northern Xinjiang province (an adjacent region) was almost three to one in 1990. It was pointed out that this precedent could be replicated in other regions. "It is not a coincidence that Qinghai has experienced a similar demographic transition. The dramatic demographic changes in Xinjiang and Qinghai raise some serious questions for the future of Tibet."<sup>46</sup> Ironically, many ethnic Chinese would prefer not to live in TAR—particularly on the Tibetan plateau—and would leave if given the opportunity and incentive by the PRC government.

•Promoting respect for human rights, including freedom of religion and education, and determining mechanisms for ensuring compliance.

The PRC is a party to the *U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment*<sup>47</sup> and has strenuously denied

charges of human rights abuses in Tibet, arguing that the people there enjoy political rights now that were denied under the "feudal regime" prior to the "peaceful liberation" in 1949/50.<sup>48</sup> Nevertheless, serious allegations have been made against PRC rule in regard to human rights violations. U.S. State Department documents have noted patterns of human rights violations by the PRC in Tibet. The *Country Report on Human Rights Practices*, issued by the State Department in February 1993, states that "Refugees have frequently and credibly reported on torture and mistreatment in Tibet's penal institutions."<sup>49</sup> Human rights organizations, such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International, have been forceful in their criticisms of China's human rights record in Tibet, contending that human rights violations are pervasive. According to a 1988 Asia Watch report, "There is little doubt now that torture is often part of the routine in political arrests and incarceration in Tibet, and that the use of cattle prods is common in such instances."<sup>50</sup>

• Developing measures for regulating environmental abuses in Tibet.

As outlined in the report on the Permanent Tribunal of People's meeting in Strasbourg, France, in November 1992, existing treatment of the environment threatens "the right of the Tibetan people to subsist and to survive in their own land."<sup>51</sup> The conclusions of the tribunal were drawn from evidence concerning deforestation,<sup>52</sup> soil erosion, and other alleged mismanagement of Tibet's natural resources. The use of toxic fertilizers and pesticides in commercial agriculture was also mentioned as having particularly damaging side effects on the high-altitude ecosystem. The increase in population has raised questions about the ability of the region to support the needs of the people and wildlife. Finally, serious allegations were raised regarding the dumping of radioactive waste in Tibet. Such wastes allegedly come from uranium mining on the eastern Tibetan plateau and from nuclear facilities in central Tibet. These charges have not been verified by the tribunal or by the international community.

• Ensuring legitimate Chinese security interests in the region.

The strategic value of Tibet is important to China. As the "high ground" of Asia, it serves as both a defensive barrier from invasion and as a potentially offensive position. The Chinese military see this region as critical. According to one of the Chinese presenters, Chinese military installations now exist on Tibetan soil, and Tibetan territory affords access to installations in northern China. In dealing with the territorial demands of a political solution, strategic concerns will be important to the PRC.

The Dalai Lama has proposed Tibet as a "zone of *Ahimsa*" (i.e., a demilitarized zone), though he acknowledges that this can only take place gradually. It is argued that demilitarization of the region would save both India and the PRC significant revenue and resources by easing the mutual burden of deploying armed forces in the border regions and would also ease tensions between India and the PRC. Terms that ensure mutual security and stability in the area should be discussed.

### ***Policy Implications***

The following implications for policy are derived from the conference discussion and private talks with participants after the conference.

•Growing concern throughout the world for the integrity and worth of ethnically and culturally distinct peoples raises new international expectations. The way countries like China treat such groups will therefore be subject to increasing international scrutiny.

Most countries respond to international pressure when it is the result of collective action. This statement is as applicable to the PRC as it is to the United States or any of the European Community or developing nations. By contrast, an individual country's criticisms do not have the same authority and are often seen as attacks by the receiving country. Trying to predict how the PRC will respond to external pressures is difficult, but these two points should be kept in mind.

The ability of technology to disseminate information quickly and effectively throughout the world has a new impact on the domestic affairs of

countries. No longer can any nation—European, African, Asian, American—shut itself off from the rest of the world. This phenomenon has developed contemporaneously with the increasing importance accorded to international human rights instruments over the past forty years. The result is that the standards by which countries are judged have become more demanding, and closer scrutiny is given to issues such as human rights and the treatment of culturally distinct peoples. This new set of standards can be expected to apply to Tibet.

•Negotiation of the key issues between representatives of the Chinese government and Tibetans in an atmosphere of open communication is essential to a process of reconciliation.

The peaceful resolution of any conflict necessarily entails dialogue. Accordingly, the issues outlined above can be resolved only through negotiation and frank discussion between representatives of the People's Republic of China and representatives of the Dalai Lama.

A number of factors have hindered this process in the past. The preconditions to negotiation and unacceptable demands put forth by both parties are primary obstacles. Preconditions requiring the Dalai Lama to relinquish all rights to self-determination before entering negotiations are one such example. Similarly, Tibetan emphasis on independence—despite Chinese statements that this issue is non-negotiable—obstructs the beginning of a meaningful dialogue. Such issues polarize the debate and foster an all-or-nothing attitude. Addressing other issues—particularly those of religious and cultural tolerance—as a way to initiate dialogue might prove successful in fostering a productive peace process.

•Opportunities for third-party mediation may exist and should be explored.

There appears to be considerable resistance to open talks regarding the future of Tibet. Further, there are certain issues that would be difficult for either side to negotiate. In both of these respects, a third-party mediator could be useful. Such a mediator could help break down the resistance to talks and

keep attention focused on the progress made. As a third party, the mediator could propose options that the parties to the negotiation would find difficult to accept were they to come from the other side. Admittedly, there are likely to be difficulties in finding a suitable mediator, one strong enough to be listened to yet impartial enough not to prejudice the outcome. While a third-party mediator may not be the answer, the option should not be rejected out of hand. Of course, the political will—from both sides—necessary to foster a process of reconciliation remains the key to peace.

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<sup>1</sup> While the views expressed in this paper are drawn from the conference discussion, agreement on specific points may or may not be shared by all the participants. The conference covered a wide range of issues, the general conclusions of which are embodied in this paper. It should be noted that representatives of the PRC were invited but declined to attend.

<sup>2</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *Tibet—Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation (The White Paper)* (Beijing: 1992), p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> ". . . The then Tibetan Regent Dagzhag Ngawang Sungrab and others who were in control of the Tibetan local government, supported by some foreign forces and disregarding the interests of the country and the Tibetans, rejected the central government's call for negotiation on the peaceful liberation of Tibet. They deployed the main body of the Tibetan army in the Qamdo area in east Tibet for armed resistance. Under such circumstances, the central government was left with no choice and had to order the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to cross the Jinsha River in October 1950, and Qamdo was liberated." *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 28, 1992, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs L. Desaix Anderson stated that "The United States, like all other governments throughout the world, considers Tibet to be a part of China, with the status of an autonomous region. No country recognizes Tibet as independent of China. The United States has never taken the position that Tibet is an independent country, nor has it recognized the Dalai Lama as the leader of a government in exile." It should also be noted that the State Department authorization bill that was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law on October 28, 1991, contained a sense of the Congress resolution declaring Tibet to be an occupied country whose true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. While stating the congressional position on this issue, the resolution does not have the force of law.

<sup>6</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *The White Paper*, p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> Address to members of the U.S. Congress by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1987.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Michael van Walt van Praag, *The Status of Tibet* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *The White Paper*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> In the period between 1911 and 1949, Tibet did have an independent government, currency, army, judicial system, postal system, and administration, and did enjoy formal relations with neighboring countries. In the early part of the twentieth century, Tibet also concluded treaties with China and Great Britain. However, Tibet did not maintain bilateral relations with Western nations and was not formally recognized by the League of Nations or the United Nations.

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- 13 The European states, for the most part, respected Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet, as articulated in the Convention between Great Britain and Russia, 1907, signed at St. Petersburg, August 31, 1907. The term "suzerainty" is itself disputed, though it is generally interpreted to mean that Tibet was a vassal state of China.
- 14 Lodi G. Gyari, president of International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), in private discussions. Michael van Walt van Praag, transcript, pp. 53-4.
- 15 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 550.
- 16 Robert Thurman, "Religious Intolerance/Tolerance in the Future of Tibet and China," p. 1.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports for 1992*; U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992); U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing record, July 28, 1992, *U.S. and Chinese Policies Toward Occupied Tibet* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
- 19 In the 1980s, the PRC acknowledged the severity of this destruction and stated on several occasions its intention to undo much of the damage.
- 20 *The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (The Seventeen-Point Agreement)*, May 23, 1951.
- 21 Article 36 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China states, "Citizens of the PRC enjoy freedom of religious belief. No organ of state, mass organization or person is allowed to force any citizen to believe or not believe in religion." This principle is also upheld in *The White Paper: "Respect for and protection of freedom of religious belief is a basic policy of the Chinese Government."* p. 56.
- 22 John Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of Snows* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 228-40.
- 23 International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), *Forbidden Freedoms: Beijing's Control of Religion in Tibet* (Washington: ICT, 1990), p. 7.
- 24 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law* (Geneva: ICJ, 1959). It should be noted that the objectivity of the report was called into question by one of the Institute conference participants, who commented that funding of the ICJ by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the late 1950s undermined its credibility and that the investigation was not a serious effort to present an unbiased perspective of the situation in Tibet. Other participants disagreed with this judgment. While acknowledging CIA support to the ICJ itself, the participants denied the funding had any appreciable effect on the substance of the report.
- 25 "The general conclusion is irresistible that the Chinese were determined to use all methods at their disposal to eliminate religious belief and to substitute Communist doctrines." *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 27 The Tibetan government-in-exile claims that there were more than 6,200 monasteries in Tibet prior to 1950, while Chinese sources recognized only 2,400. Both sides agree that only a few were not destroyed or damaged by the 1970s.
- 28 The policy advocated by Hu Yaobang on Tibet was listed as one of several reasons given for his removal as general secretary of the Communist party.
- 29 Lodi Gyari, "Religion and the Future of Tibet," presented at Institute conference.
- 30 International Campaign for Tibet, *Forbidden Freedoms*, p. 58.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 32 Lodi Gyari, "Religion and the Future of Tibet."
- 33 Tom Grunfeld noted in correspondence that "Indeed, few, if any, Tibetans have power on a national . . . level. But of the total number of government functionaries (*ganbu*) in the TAR some

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60-70% are ethnic Tibetans. This means that in the rural areas where there are few Chinese, these Tibetan officials do actually exert power."

<sup>34</sup> It is accepted among most scholars that the Tibetans signed this agreement under duress. This is evidenced by the Dalai Lama's repudiation of the agreement upon entering exile in 1959. Further, many of the terms of the agreement provide legitimation for Chinese policies of discrimination and cultural control. However, some of the principles—if adhered to—would provide relief for the situation that many Tibetans experience today.

<sup>35</sup> *Seventeen-Point Agreement*.

<sup>36</sup> Note accompanying the letter of the Dalai Lama to Mr. Deng Xiaoping and Mr. Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, September 11, 1992, p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> Tu Wei-ming, Harvard University, transcripts, p. 270.

<sup>38</sup> Jeffrey Hopkins, University of Virginia, transcripts, p. 200.

<sup>39</sup> Tu Wei-ming, Harvard University, transcripts, p. 157.

<sup>40</sup> van Walt van Praag, *The Status of Tibet*, p. 200.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>42</sup> Lodi Gyari, president of the ICT, lists this as one of the most immediate threats to Tibetans. The issue also was raised numerous times during the Institute conference discussion, generally with ominous overtones.

<sup>43</sup> Leo Orleans, "Tibet: Concern or Irritant in U.S.-China Relations," and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Inc., *Tibet: Issues for Americans* (New York: National Committee China Policy Series, No. Four, 1992).

<sup>44</sup> National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Inc., *Tibet: Issues for Americans*, p. 11.

<sup>45</sup> Abdullah Yatsin, "China's Dual Policy and the Tibetan Crisis," p. 4.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports for 1991*, Appendix C.

<sup>48</sup> The PRC government also claims that there were significant violations of human rights prior to 1950 and that the situation has improved under Communist rule. ". . . (previously existing) barbarous punishments are prohibited and privately established prisons have all been dismantled." Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *The White Paper*, p. 42.

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports for 1992*, p. 541.

<sup>50</sup> Asia Watch, *Evading Scrutiny: Violations of Human Rights After the Closing of Tibet* (Washington: Asia Watch, 1988), p. 26.

<sup>51</sup> "Report on the Permanent Tribunal of Peoples, Session on Tibet," held in Strasbourg, France November 16-20, 1992, p. 19.

<sup>52</sup> The PRC did present the steps it was taking for reforestation to the tribunal.





## Biographical Note

**David Little** is senior scholar in the Religion, Ethics, and Human Rights program at the United States Institute of Peace. He is also the Institute's director of the Working Group on Religion, Ideology, and Peace, which is currently conducting an extended study of religion, nationalism, and intolerance. He was formerly professor of religious studies at the University of Virginia and has also taught at Harvard and Yale Divinity Schools as well as a number of other colleges and universities. His most recent publications are *Human Rights and Conflict of Cultures: Freedom of Religion and Conscience in the West and Islam* (with John Kelsay and Abdulaziz Sachedina), *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance*, and *Sri Lanka: Invention of Enmity* (forthcoming).

**Scott W. Hibbard** is currently a research assistant at the United States Institute of Peace. He holds an M.Sc. in political theory from the London School of Economics and Political Science, as well as an M.A. in liberal studies from Georgetown University. He worked as a congressional staff member between 1985 and 1992 for Rep. C. Thomas McMillen, Rep. Louise M. Slaughter, and Sen. Dale Bumpers.



Appendix 1: Conference Agenda

**Tibet: Religion, Conflict, and Cooperation**

September 27 - 28, 1993

National Education Association Conference Center  
16th and M Streets, NW, Washington, D.C.

**September 27: General Context of Conflict**

*9:30am-10:00pm* **Welcome to Participants and Guests**

*Richard H. Solomon*, president, United States Institute of Peace  
*David Little*, senior scholar, United States Institute of Peace

*10:00am-1:00pm* **Historical Background**

*Tom Grunfeld*, professor, Empire State College  
*Michael van Walt van Praag*, general secretary,  
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, Geneva  
Commentator: *Elliot Sperling*, professor, Indiana University

*2:00pm-5:30pm* **Current Situation**

*Ming-Xu Xu*, research fellow, Center for Modern China  
*Tseten Wang-chuk*, co-editor, Tibet Forum  
Commentator: *Jeffrey Hopkins*, professor, University of Virginia

**September 28: Prospects for Amelioration**

*9:30am-1:00pm* **Future Scenarios: Religious Tolerance or Religious Intolerance?**

*Lodi Gyari*, president, International Campaign for Tibet  
*Abdullah Yatsin*, professor  
Commentator: *June Teufel Dreyer*, director, East Asian Programs,  
University of Miami

*2:00pm-5:30pm* **Mean Towards Religious Tolerance**

*Tu Wei-ming*, professor, Harvard University  
*Robert Thurman*, professor, Columbia University  
Commentator: *Sidney Jones*, executive director, Asia Watch



## Appendix 2: Conference Participants

Alexandra Arriaga, Congressional Human Rights Caucus, Washington, D.C.  
Kevin Avruch, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va.  
June Teufel Dreyer, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla.  
Francis Deng, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.  
Yuan Feng, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.  
Lodi Gyari, International Campaign for Tibet, Washington, D.C.  
Tom Grunfeld, Empire State College, New York, N.Y.  
Jeremy Gunn, Lawyer, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.  
Rosalind Hackett, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn.  
Hurst Hannum, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass.  
Jeffrey Hopkins, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.  
Sidney Jones, Asia Watch, New York, N.Y.  
John Kelsay, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.  
Samir Khalaf, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.  
David Little, Senior Scholar, United States Institute of Peace  
Ann Mayer, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penn.  
Charles E. Nelson, Executive Vice President, United States Institute of Peace  
Sulayman Nyang, Howard University, Washington, D.C.  
Gerard Powers, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, D.C.  
Abdulaziz Sachedina, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.  
Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace  
Elliot Sperling, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.  
Robert Thurman, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
Michael van Walt van Praag, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization,  
Geneva, Switzerland  
William Vendley, World Conference on Religion and Peace, New York, N.Y.  
Tseten Wang-chuk, Tibet Forum, Washington, D.C.  
Tu Wei-ming, professor, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
Gary Williams, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.  
Ming-Xu Xu, Center for Modern China, Seattle, Wash.  
Abdullah Yatsin



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